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Introduction
Transportation systems
Two dimensions
Supply = infrastructure
Demand = behavior, choices
Congestion = mismatch
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Introduction
Transportation systems
Objectives
Minimize costs
Maximize satisfaction
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Introduction
Transportation systems
Maximize revenues
Revenues = Benefits - Costs
Costs: examples
Building infrastructure
Operating the system
Environmental externalities
Benefits: examples
Income from ticket sales
Social welfare
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Introduction
Demand-supply interactions
Operations Research
Given the demand...
configure the system
Behavioral models
Given the configuration of
the system...
predict the demand
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Demand and supply optimization November 16, 2015 6 / 76
Introduction
Research objectives
Framework for demand-supply interactions
General: not designed for a specific application or context.
Flexible: wide variety of demand and supply models.
Scalable: the level of complexity can be adjusted.
Integrated: not sequential.
Operational: can be solved efficiently.
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Demand and supply optimization November 16, 2015 7 / 76
Demand
Outline
1 Introduction
2 Demand
3 Supply
4 Integrated framework
5 A simple example
A linear formulation
Example: one theater
Example: two theaters
6 Summary
7 Appendix: dealing with capacities
Example: two theaters
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Demand and supply optimization November 16, 2015 8 / 76
Demand
Aggregate demand
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Demand
Aggregate demand
Homogeneous population
Identical behavior
Price (P) and quantity (Q)
Demand function: Q = f (P)
Demand curve: P = f −1(Q)
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Demand
Disaggregate demand
Heterogeneous population
Different behaviors
Many variables:
Attributes: price, travel time,
reliability, frequency, etc.
Characteristics: age, income,
education, etc.
Complex demand/inverse
demand functions.
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Demand
Disaggregate demand
Behavioral models
Demand = combination of
individual choices.
Modeling demand = modeling
choice.
Behavioral models: choice
models.
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Demand
Choice models
Daniel McFadden
UC Berkeley 1963, MIT 1977,
UC Berkeley 1991
Laureate of The Bank of Sweden
Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2000
Owns a farm and vineyard in
Napa Valley
“Farm work clears the mind,
and the vineyard is a great place
to prove theorems”
2000
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Demand
Decision rules
Neoclassical economic theory
Preference-indifference operator &
1 reflexivity
a & a ∀a ∈ Cn
2 transitivity
a & b and b & c ⇒ a & c ∀a, b, c ∈ Cn
3 comparability
a & b or b & a ∀a, b ∈ Cn
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Demand
Decision rules
Utility
∃ Un : Cn −→ R : a Un(a) such that
a & b ⇔ Un(a) ≥ Un(b) ∀a, b ∈ Cn
Remarks
Utility is a latent concept
It cannot be directly observed
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Demand
Decision rules
Choice
Individual n
Choice set Cn = {1, . . . , Jn}
Utilities Uin, ∀i ∈ Cn
i is chosen iff Uin = maxj∈Cn Ujn
Underlying assumption: no tie.
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Demand
Example
Two transportation modes
U1 = −βt1 − γc1
U2 = −βt2 − γc2
with β, γ > 0
Mode 1 is chosen if
U1 ≥ U2 iff − βt1 − γc1 ≥ −βt2 − γc2
that is
−
β
γ
t1 − c1 ≥ −
β
γ
t2 − c2
or
c1 − c2 ≤ −
β
γ
(t1 − t2)
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Demand
Example
Trade-off
c1 − c2 ≤ −
β
γ
(t1 − t2)
c1 − c2 in currency unity (CHF)
t1 − t2 in time units (hours)
β/γ: CHF/hours
Value of time
Willingness to pay to save travel time.
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Demand
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Demand
Assumptions
Decision-maker
perfect discriminating capability
full rationality
permanent consistency
Analyst
knowledge of all attributes
perfect knowledge of & (or
Un(·))
no measurement error
Must deal with uncertainty
Random utility models
For each individual n and alternative i
Uin = Vin + εin
and
P(i |Cn) = P[Uin = max
j∈Cn
Ujn] = P(Uin ≥ Ujn ∀j ∈ Cn)
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Demand
Logit model
Utility
Uin = Vin + εin
Choice probability: logit model
Pn(i |Cn) =
yine
Vin∑
j∈C yjne
Vjn
.
Decision-maker n
Alternative i ∈ Cn
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Demand
Variables: xin = (zin, sn)
Attributes of alternative i : zin
Cost / price
Travel time
Waiting time
Level of comfort
Number of transfers
Late/early arrival
etc.
Characteristics of decision-maker n:
sn
Income
Age
Sex
Trip purpose
Car ownership
Education
Profession
etc.
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Demand
Demand curve
Disaggregate model
Pn(i |cin, zin, sn)
Total demand
D(i) =
∑
n
Pn(i |cin, zin, sn)
Difficulty
Non linear and non convex in cin and zin
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Supply
Optimization problem
Given...
the demand
Find...
the best configuration of the transportation system.
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Supply
Example: airline
Context
An airline considers to propose various destinations i = {1, . . . , J} to
its customers.
Each potential destination i is served by an aircraft, with capacity ci .
The price of the ticket for destination i is pi .
The demand is known: Wi passengers want to travel to i .
The fixed cost of operating a flight to destination i is Fi .
The airline cannot invest more than a budget B .
Question
What destinations should the airline serve to maximize its revenues?
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Supply
Example: airline
Decisions variables
yi ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if destination i is served, 0 otherwise.
Maximize revenues
max
J∑
i=1
min(Wi , ci )piyi
Constraints
J∑
i=1
Fiyi ≤ B
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Supply
Example: airline
Integer linear optimization problem
Decision variables are integers.
Objective function and constraints are linear.
Here: knapsack problem.
Solving the problem
Branch and bound
Cutting planes
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Supply
Example: airline
Pricing
What price pi should the airline propose?
max
J∑
i=1
min(Wi , ci )piyi
Issues
Non linear objective
Unbounded problem
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Supply
Example: airline
Unbounded problem
As demand is constant, the airline can make money with very high
prices.
We need to take into account the impact of price on demand.
Logit model
Wi =
∑
n
Pn(i |pi , zin, sn)
Pn(i |pi , zin, sn) =
yie
Vin(pi ,zin,sn)∑
j∈C yje
Vjn(pj ,zjn,sn)
.
The problem becomes highly non linear.
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Integrated framework
The main idea
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Integrated framework
The main idea
Linearization
Hopeless to linearize the logit formula (we tried...)
First principles
Each customer solves an optimization problem
Solution
Use the utility and not the probability
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Integrated framework
A linear formulation
Utility function
Uin = Vin + εin =
∑
k
βkxink + f (zin) + εin.
Simulation
Assume a distribution for εin
E.g. logit: i.i.d. extreme value
Draw R realizations ξinr ,
r = 1, . . . ,R
The choice problem becomes
deterministic
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Integrated framework
Scenarios
Draws
Draw R realizations ξinr , r = 1, . . . ,R
We obtain R scenarios
Uinr =
∑
k
βkxink + f (zin) + ξinr .
For each scenario r , we can identify the largest utility.
It corresponds to the chosen alternative.
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Integrated framework
Comparing utilities
Variables
µijnr =
{
1 if Uinr ≥ Ujnr ,
0 if Uinr < Ujnr .
Constraints
(µijnr − 1)Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ µijnrMnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
where
|Uinr − Ujnr | ≤ Mnr , ∀i , j ,
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Integrated framework
Comparing utilities
(µijnr − 1)Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ µijnrMnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
Constraints: µijnr = 1
0 ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ Mnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
Ujnr ≤ Uinr , ∀i , j , n, r .
Constraints: µijnr = 0
−Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ 0, ∀i , j , n, r .
Uinr ≤ Ujnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
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Integrated framework
Comparing utilities
(µijnr − 1)Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ µijnrMnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
Equivalence if no tie
µijnr = 1 =⇒ Uinr ≥ Ujnr
µijnr = 0 =⇒ Uinr ≤ Ujnr
Uinr > Ujnr =⇒ µijnr = 1
Uinr < Ujnr =⇒ µijnr = 0
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Integrated framework
Accounting for availabilities
Motivation
If yi = 0, alternative i is not available.
Its utility should not be involved in any constraint.
New variables: two alternatives are both available
ηij = yiyj
Linearization:
yi + yj ≤ 1 + ηij ,
ηij ≤ yi ,
ηij ≤ yj .
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Integrated framework
Comparing utilities of available alternatives
Constraints
Mnrηij − 2Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr −Mnrµijnr ≤ (1− ηij)Mnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
ηij = 1 and µijnr = 1
0 ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ Mnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
ηij = 1 and µijnr = 0
−Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ 0, ∀i , j , n, r .
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Integrated framework
Comparing utilities of available alternatives
Constraints
Mnrηij − 2Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr −Mnrµijnr ≤ (1− ηij)Mnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
ηij = 0 and µijnr = 1
−Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ 2Mnr , ∀i , j , n, r ,
ηij = 0 and µijnr = 0
−2Mnr ≤ Uinr − Ujnr ≤ Mnr , ∀i , j , n, r ,
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Integrated framework
Comparing utilities of available alternatives
Valid inequalities
µijnr ≤ yi , ∀i , j , n, r ,
µijnr + µjinr ≤ 1, ∀i , j , n, r .
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Integrated framework
The choice
Variables
winr =
{
1 if n chooses i in scenario r ,
0 otherwise
Maximum utility
winr ≤ µijnr , ∀i , j , n, r .
Availability
winr ≤ yi , ∀i , n, r .
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Integrated framework
The choice
One choice∑
i∈C
winr = 1, ∀n, r .
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Integrated framework
Demand and revenues
Demand
Wi =
1
R
n∑
n=1
R∑
r=1
winr .
Revenues
Ri =
1
R
N∑
n=1
pi
R∑
r=1
winr .
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A simple example
A simple example
Data
C: set of movies
Population of N individuals
Utility function:
Uin = βinpin + f (zin) + εin
Decision variables
What movies to propose? yi
What price? pin
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A simple example
Demand model
Logit model
Probability that n chooses movie i :
P(i |y , pn, zn) =
yie
βinpin+f (zin)∑
j yje
βjnpjn+f (zjn)
Total revenue: ∑
i∈C
yi
N∑
n=1
pinP(i |y , pn, zn)
Non linear and non convex in the decision variables
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A simple example Example: one theater
Example: programming movie theaters
Data
Two alternatives: my theater (m) and
the competition (c)
We assume an homogeneous
population of N individuals
Uc = 0 + εc
Um = βcpm + εm
βc < 0
Logit model: εm i.i.d. EV
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A simple example Example: one theater
Demand and revenues
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A simple example Example: one theater
Optimization (with GLPK)
Data
N = 1
R = 100
Um = −10pm + 3
Prices: 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40,
0.50
Results
Optimum price: 0.3
Demand: 56%
Revenues: 0.168
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A simple example Example: one theater
Heterogeneous population
Two groups in the population
Uin = βnpi + cn
Young fans: 2/3
β1 = −10, c1 = 3
Others: 1/3
β1 = −0.9, c1 = 0
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A simple example Example: one theater
Demand and revenues
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
D
em
an
d
R
ev
en
u
es
Price
Revenues
Demand
Young fans
Others
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Demand and supply optimization November 16, 2015 54 / 76
A simple example Example: one theater
Optimization
Data
N = 3
R = 100
Um1 = −10pm + 3
Um2 = −0.9pm
Prices: 0.3, 0.7, 1.1, 1.5, 1.9
Results
Optimum price: 0.3
Customer 1 (fan): 60% [theory:
50 %]
Customer 2 (fan) : 49%
[theory: 50 %]
Customer 3 (other) : 45%
[theory: 43 %]
Demand: 1.54 (51%)
Revenues: 0.48
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, different types of films
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, different types of films
Theater m
Expensive
Star Wars Episode VII
Theater k
Cheap
Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy
Heterogeneous demand
Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
One third of the population is old (less price sensitive)
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, different types of films
Data
Theaters m and k
N = 6
R = 10
Umn = −10pm + 4 , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Umn = −0.9pm, n = 3, 6
Ukn = −10pk + 0 , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Ukn = −0.9pk , n = 3, 6
Prices m: 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
Prices k: half price
Theater m
Optimum price m: 1.6
4 young customers: 0
2 old customers: 0.5
Demand: 0.5 (8.3%)
Revenues: 0.8
Theater k
Optimum price m: 0.5
Young customers: 0.8
Old customers: 1.5
Demand: 2.3 (38%)
Revenues: 1.15
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, same type of films
Theater m
Expensive
Star Wars Episode VII
Theater k
Cheap
Star Wars Episode VIII
Heterogeneous demand
Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
One third of the population is old (less price sensitive)
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, same type of films
Data
Theaters m and k
N = 6
R = 10
Umn = −10pm + 4 ,
n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Umn = −0.9pm, n = 3, 6
Ukn = −10pk + 4 ,
n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Ukn = −0.9pk , n = 3, 6
Prices m: 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
Prices k : half price
Theater m
Optimum price m: 1.8
Young customers: 0
Old customers: 1.9
Demand: 1.9 (31.7%)
Revenues: 3.42
Theater k
Closed
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Extension: dealing with capacities
Demand may exceed supply
Not every choice can be
accommodated
Difficulty: who has access?
Assumption: priority list is
exogenous
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Summary
Summary
Demand and supply
Supply: prices and capacity
Demand: choice of customers
Interaction between the two
Discrete choice models
Rich family of behavioral models
Strong theoretical foundations
Great deal of concrete applications
Capture the heterogeneity of behavior
Probabilistic models
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Summary
Optimization
Discrete choice models
Non linear and non convex
Idea: use utility instead of probability
Rely on simulation to capture stochasticity
Proposed formulation
General: not designed for a specific application or context.
Flexible: wide variety of demand and supply models.
Scalable: the level of complexity can be adjusted.
Integrated: not sequential.
Operational: can be solved efficiently.
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Summary
Ongoing research
Revenue management
Airlines, train operators, etc.
Decomposition methods
Scenarios are (almost) independent from each other (except objective
function)
Individuals are also loosely coupled (except for capacity constraints)
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Summary
Thank you!
Questions?
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Appendix: dealing with capacities
Dealing with capacities
Demand may exceed supply
Not every choice can be
accommodated
Difficulty: who has access?
Assumption: priority list is
exogenous
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Appendix: dealing with capacities
Priority list
Application dependent
First in, first out
Frequent travelers
Subscribers
...
In this framework
The list of customers must be sorted
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Appendix: dealing with capacities
Dealing with capacities
Variables
yin: decision of the operator
yinr : availability
Constraints
N∑
n=1
winr ≤ ci
yinr ≤ yin
yi(n+1)r ≤ yinr
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Appendix: dealing with capacities
Constraints
ci (1− yinr ) ≤
n−1∑
m=1
wimr + (1− yin)cmax
yin = 1, yinr = 1
0 ≤
n−1∑
m=1
wimr
yin = 1, yinr = 0
ci ≤
n−1∑
m=1
wimr
yin = 0, yinr = 0
ci ≤
n−1∑
m=1
wimr + cmax
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Appendix: dealing with capacities
Constraints
n−1∑
m=1
wimr + (1− yin)cmax ≤ (ci − 1)yinr +max(n, cmax)(1− yinr )
yin = 1, yinr = 1
1 +
n−1∑
m=1
wimr ≤ ci
yin = 1, yinr = 0
n−1∑
m=1
wimr ≤ max(n, cmax)
yin = 0, yinr = 0
n−1∑
m=1
wimr + cmax ≤ max(n, cmax)
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Appendix: dealing with capacities Example: two theaters
Two theaters, different types of films
Data
Theaters m and k
Capacity: 2
N = 6
R = 5
Umn = −10pm + 4, n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Umn = −0.9pm, n = 3, 6
Ukn = −10pk + 0, n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Ukn = −0.9pk , n = 3, 6
Prices m: 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
Prices k: half price
Theater m
Optimum price m: 1.8
Demand: 0.2 (3.3%)
Revenues: 0.36
Theater k
Optimum price m: 0.5
Demand: 2 (33.3%)
Revenues: 1.15
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Appendix: dealing with capacities Example: two theaters
Example of two scenarios
Customer Choice Capacity m Capacity k
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
3 k 2 1
4 0 2 1
5 0 2 1
6 k 2 0
Customer Choice Capacity m Capacity k
1 0 2 2
2 k 2 1
3 0 2 1
4 k 2 0
5 0 2 0
6 0 2 0
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Appendix: dealing with capacities Example: two theaters
Two theaters: all prices divided by 2
Data
Theaters m and k
Capacity: 2
N = 6
R = 5
Umn = −10pm + 4, n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Umn = −0.9pm, n = 3, 6
Ukn = −10pk + 0, n = 1, 2, 4, 5
Ukn = −0.9pk , n = 3, 6
Prices m: 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
Prices k: half price
Theater m
Optimum price m: 0.5
Demand: 1.4
Revenues: 0.7
Theater k
Optimum price m: 0.45
Demand: 1.6
Revenues: 0.72
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Appendix: dealing with capacities Example: two theaters
Example of two scenarios
Customer Choice Capacity m Capacity k
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
3 0 2 2
4 k 2 1
5 k 2 0
6 0 2 0
Customer Choice Capacity m Capacity k
1 k 2 1
2 k 2 0
3 0 2 0
4 m 1 0
5 0 1 0
6 m 0 0
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